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In this paper we estimate the causal effects on child mortality from moving into less distressed neighborhood
environments. We match mortality data to information on every child in public housing that applied
for a housing voucher in Chicago in 1997 (N=11,848). Families were randomly assigned to the voucher
wait list, and only some families were offered vouchers. The odds ratio for the effects of being offered
a housing voucher on overall mortality rates is equal to 1.11 for all children (95% CI 0.54 to 2.10),
1.50 for boys (95% CI 0.72 to 2.89) and 0.00 for girls – that is, the voucher offer is perfectly protective
for mortality for girls (95% CI 0 to 0.79). Our paper also addresses a methodological issue that may
arise in studies of low-probability outcomes – perfect prediction by key explanatory variables.
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In this paper we seek to estimate the causal effects on mortality among 
disadvantaged children from moving into less dangerous, economically distressed 
housing and neighborhood environment. Our study takes advantage of a natural 
experiment created by the random assignment of housing vouchers to public housing 
families in the 3
rd largest city in the U.S. (Chicago). Our study sample consists of every 
public housing family that applied for a voucher in Chicago in 1997, when the city 
opened its housing-voucher wait-list for the first time in a dozen years. Ours is thus one 
of the largest randomized experiments involving voucher-induced changes in social 
environments (together with Moving to Opportunity), and the first that we know of to 
examine one particularly important and well measured health outcome – mortality. 
Health outcomes for children and adults vary dramatically across neighborhoods 
within the United States, even after statistically controlling for various individual- or 
family-level risk and protective factors. These patterns have generated concern among 
both policymakers and scientists that health outcomes may be causally affected by 
neighborhood attributes such as the physical environment (e.g., housing stock, 
environmental toxins, crime), local institutions (e.g., health care providers, grocery 
stores, parks), or aspects of the social environment that may shape people’s information, 
preferences and norms about health-related behaviors (Kawachi and Berkman, 2003, 
Sampson 2003). Yet variation across neighborhoods in health could instead reflect 
differences in neighborhood compositions. Observational studies may confound the 
causal effects of neighborhood and housing conditions with those of difficult-to-measure 
individual or family attributes associated with both health and residential sorting.  4
As Jody Heymann and Aron Fischer (2003) have argued in their review of this 
literature: “The best solution-oriented research to date has been conducted on moving 
people out of hard-hit neighborhoods” through government housing programs. For 
example, the one randomized mobility experiment that has been conducted to date, 
Moving to Opportunity (MTO), found that MTO-assisted moves to less distressed 
neighborhoods reduced obesity and mental health problems among adults, had mixed 
effects on risky behaviors by youth, with girls doing better and boys on balance doing 
worse as a result of the moves, and had no detectable effects on survey-reported child 
health outcomes (Kling, Ludwig and Katz, 2005, Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007, 
Fortson and Sanbonmatsu, 2010). The results for children and youth in MTO are 
particularly surprising in light of the large social-epidemiological literature. What 
remains unclear is whether the gender difference in effects in MTO are idiosyncratic to 
that sample, and, perhaps even more importantly, whether neighborhoods really do not 
matter much for child health outcomes or if instead survey measures of health are too 
limited to capture any impacts. 
Ours is the first study we know of to use a plausibly exogenous source of 
identifying variation to estimate the effects of changes in housing and neighborhood 
conditions on a particularly important, and well measured, child health outcome – 
mortality. We match Vital Statistics mortality data from 1997-2005 to information on 
every child age≤18 in every public housing household that applied for a housing voucher 
in Chicago in 1997, when the city opened its housing voucher wait-list for the first time 
in a dozen years (N=11,848). Our research design exploits the fact that families were 
randomly assigned to the voucher program’s wait list, and only some families were  5
offered vouchers. We estimate a discrete-time hazard model on overall mortality. Given 
previous findings from MTO for important differences in the effects of neighborhood 
mobility on youth outcomes, we examine mortality impacts for males and females 
separately, as well as for the pooled study sample. 
The odds ratio for the effects of being offered a housing voucher on overall 
mortality rates is equal to 1.11 for all children (95% CI 0.54 to 2.10), 1.50 for boys (95% 
CI 0.72 to 2.89) and 0.00 for girls – that is, the voucher offer is perfectly protective for 
mortality for girls (95% CI 0 to 0.79). These findings suggest that social environments 
may play an important role in affecting the health outcomes of some of our nation’s most 
disadvantaged children. The gender difference we find in the effects on health from 
changing social environments echoes those from MTO, although as with MTO, the 
reasons why responses are so different for males and females remain poorly understood. 
It is interesting that in our data the suggestive (but not statistically significant) indications 
of increased mortality to male youth from residential mobility are concentrated among 
homicides, while declines in mortality to female youth are concentrated among deaths 
due to disease and accidents. 
In addition to our substantive findings, our paper addresses a methodological 
issue which we believe may increasingly arise in quasi-experimental research on low-
probability outcomes such as mortality. Among girls receiving the housing voucher, there 
were no deaths after voucher assignment.  This may result from having a large but not 
massive data sample, a strongly protective treatment, and a low probability outcome.  For 
girls, the treatment is predicted to be perfectly protective, and Logit and Probit models do 
not directly compute confidence intervals. We solve this issue by using “profile  6
likelihood ratio confidence intervals.” These are constructed by finding the set of 
parameter values that would not be rejected by a LR test at a 5% significance level.   
The next section of the paper discusses the potential mechanisms through which 
changes in housing and neighborhood conditions may affect child health, and provides a 
selective review of the previous empirical literature with an emphasis on studies with 
strong research designs. The third section discusses our data and empirical approach. 
Section four presents our findings and the final section provides some interpretation of 
these results. 
2. Conceptual framework and previous literature 
2.1. Mechanisms 
Housing interventions that change people’s housing and neighborhood 
environments could plausibly impact mortality through multiple channels, related to both 
the physical and social environments of the neighborhood. 
Mobility could affect health for purely mechanical reasons, because housing and 
neighborhoods are bundled with environmental health risk exposures. The physical or 
institutional environment could also matter for health by affecting distance to, and hence 
the price of accessing, health-related inputs. For example, a great deal of public attention 
has been devoted to the possibility that disadvantaged urban neighborhoods may have 
limited access to health care services, particularly preventive care, and to grocery stores 
that sell fresh fruits and vegetables – or “food deserts.” Public concern has also focused 
on the possibility that liquor stores, bars, and fast food outlets (or advertising for these 
products) are disproportionately located in high-poverty urban communities.  7
Mobility to less dangerous and distressed housing and neighborhood conditions 
could also affect health through social interactions, a possibility that has been of growing 
interest among economists (see for example Manski, 2000, Becker and Murphy, 2001). 
Local social environments could influence health-related behaviors through what Manski 
calls “preference interactions,” if for example the preferences of one’s peers influences 
one’s own drinking, through “constraint interactions,” as when elevated rates of criminal 
behavior by other neighborhood residents dilute the amount police resources available to 
stop and apprehend each offender, or “expectations interactions,” if people’s views about, 
say, the health consequences of some behavior are shaped by the distribution of that 
behavior and health outcomes in the area. 
For health outcomes to young children, we expect exposure to risk and protective 
factors in the physical or institutional environment to be most relevant, as well as any 
“neighborhood effects” on the behavior of parents that wind up influencing the health 
inputs (and risks) that children experience. Data from the nationwide Vital Statistics 
system shows that the two leading cause of death to blacks ages 1-4 in 2007 were 
unintentional injuries (325 deaths) and homicides (168), which are disproportionately 
likely to occur at the hands of parents or caregivers. Congenital anomalies accounted for 
119 deaths in 2007 to this age group, while much less frequent were deaths from 
important diseases such as cancer (55), heart disease (43), chronic lower respiratory 
diseases (30), or influenza and pneumonia (29).
1 
For older children and adolescents, their own behavior may be increasingly 
important in determining their health outcomes. Particularly relevant may be behaviors 
that put young people at risk for unintentional injuries and homicides, which for 
                                                 
1 www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/index.html  8
teenagers and adults is strongly related to anti-social behavior and lifestyle decisions that 
themselves are thought by social scientists to be influenced by neighborhood 
environments. For example, in Chicago in 2008 fully 92 percent of homicide offenders 
and, more surprisingly, 72 percent of victims had a prior arrest record (CPD, 2008). 
Nearly two-thirds of homicides were thought by police to result from altercations, while 
nearly nine of every ten victims are male.  
Our study design and data provide us with limited power to disentangle the 
importance of these different behavioral mechanisms. Our reduced-form estimates 
instead capture the combined net influence of these different mechanisms that might be 
affected by housing and neighborhood conditions on the behavior of parents and children 
or youth. We try to gain some information about pathways by generating estimates 
separately by gender, and by cause of death. 
2.2 Relevant studies 
Previous epidemiological studies find strong correlations between neighborhood 
socio-economic composition or social processes and a range of health outcomes, even 
after regression-adjusting for people’s own individual health risk- and protective-factors. 
For example, Waitzman and Smith (1998) find that people living in federally designated 
poverty areas have higher rates of mortality even after controlling for individual 
characteristics; Ross and Mirowsky (2001) find that living in a disadvantaged 
neighborhood is associated with lower levels of self-reported health and physical 
functioning; and Browning and Cagney (2002) find that individuals residing in 
neighborhoods with greater collective efficacy report better overall health. Diez Roux et 
al (2001) find that adults living in disadvantaged neighborhoods are at significantly  9
greater risk of developing coronary heart disease, even after controlling for income, 
occupation, and education. Pickett and Pearl (2001), Kawachi and Berkman (2003), and 
Macintyre and Ellaway (2003) provide excellent reviews of this literature. More recently, 
Bird et al. (2010) have found that “good cholesterol” (high density lipoprotein or HDL), 
and lower systolic and diastolic blood pressure were associated with lower neighborhood 
socioeconomic status controlling for other factors. The pediatric epidemiology literature 
suggests that for children as well as adults, living in a high-poverty urban setting or 
unsafe neighborhoods is associated with adverse health outcomes (Curtis, Dooley, & 
Phipps, 2004; Lumeng et al., 2006). 
One concern with these studies arises from the possibility of endogenous sorting 
of people into neighborhoods. Observational datasets cannot perfectly measure every 
determinant of health outcomes, or of residential choices. As a result, with 
epidemiological studies there is always some question about the possible confounding of 
the causal effects of neighborhood environments on health with the influences of 
unmeasured or hard-to-measure background factors that influence health directly and are 
also associated with neighborhood selection.  
Votruba and Kling (2009) try to overcome this selection problem by examining 
the effects on health from the Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program, which starting in 
1976 helped African-American public housing residents in Chicago to move to other 
parts of the city or to very affluent, mostly-white suburban areas. Accounts of how 
Gautreaux was implemented suggest that families had limited ability to choose where 
they relocated (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum, 2000). They find that mortality rates among 
black males are relatively lower among those whose families relocated to neighborhoods  1 0
where a relatively larger share of residents have a college degree. While these findings 
are suggestive, Gautreaux did not randomly assign participants to locations and there is 
some evidence of neighborhood self-selection. 
  The one true randomized experiment that has helped move poor families out of 
distressed public housing into less disadvantaged areas is the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Moving to Opportunity (MTO) 
demonstration. Starting in 1994, MTO enrolled a total of 4600 low-income public 
housing families with children located in high-poverty census tracts in five cities – 
Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. Among adults, medium-run 
findings from the interim evaluation (4-7 years after baseline, pooling data from all five 
sites) showed a lower prevalence of obesity (BMI ≥ 30) for adults in the experimental 
group than the control group (42.0% vs. 46.8%), together with some signs of increased 
rates of exercise, improved diet, and improved mental health. No statistically significant 
effects were detected for most other adult physical health outcomes, including self-rated 
health, hypertension, physical limitations, or asthma (Kling, Liebman & Katz, 2007).  
  Among MTO youth ages 15-20 at the time of the data collection (4-7 years after 
baseline), analyses of an overall index of the absence of different health problems 
revealed worse health for males in the experimental group relative to controls, but 
positive effects on female youth (Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007). This gender difference 
in health impacts is also found in MTO impacts on a range of risky behaviors with the 
one notable exception of violent-crime arrests, which seemed to decline among both male 
and female youth who moved through MTO.   1 1
No statistically significant MTO effects were found for specific measures of individual 
health problems when examined separately, or for younger teens and children in the 
interim MTO study (Orr et al., 2003; Fortson & Sanbonmatsu, 2010). 
  One potential concern with the previous MTO research on child health stems from 
the measurement of child health outcomes, which were all from parent reports of their 
children’s health or child and teen self-reports. For example, MTO moves into less 
economically distressed areas could improve access to medical care, which could in turn 
increase awareness of health problems relative to the control group that lives in more 
disadvantaged neighborhoods. It could also be that the standards that people use to decide 
what counts as good or bad health, or even what rises to the level of trouble with some 
specific health or functional problem, might be a function of the health status of others in 
the community. To date nothing is known about the effects of MTO on objectively-
measured health outcomes for children, including one particularly important measure 
(and the focus of our study) – mortality.  
3.  Background, Data, and Methods 
3.1 Chicago’s Housing Voucher Program 
In July 1997 the firm running Chicago’s housing voucher program, CHAC, Inc., 
opened the program wait list for the first time in 12 years. 82,607 income-eligible 
families applied, of whom 8,738 were in public housing at the time. All applicants were 
randomly assigned to a wait-list. A total of 1,930 of the families in public housing at 
baseline were offered vouchers by May 2003, at which point CHAC stopped offering 
new vouchers. Our analytic sample consists of the 11,848 children ≤18 living in public 
housing when their families applied for a voucher.  1 2
3.2 Data 
  The study sample is constructed using CHAC voucher application forms and 
administrative records from the Illinois Department of Human Services (Jacob and 
Ludwig, forthcoming), which include information about baseline addresses and socio-
demographic characteristics. Probabilistic matching was used to match our sample to 
nationwide mortality records from 1997:Q3-2005:Q4 from the National Death Index 
(NDI) using identifiers such names and dates of birth. 
Our main analyses focus on 69 cases with probabilistic match scores high enough 
to be deemed “true” deaths by the NDI (National Death Index User’s Guide, 2009). 
Previous validation studies find the NDI captures 93% of all deaths and 84% of deaths to 
blacks (Calle and Terrell, 1993).
 Of the deaths in our sample, 54 occurred among the 
9,342 control group children over our 8.5 year study period,for an annual mortality rate 
of 68 per 100,000 (vs. 43 / 100,000 for blacks 1-19 nationwide in 2004) (WONDER, 
2009). As a sensitivity analysis we also present results using a lower match-quality 
threshold yielding 117 deaths to our sample, which provides one (admittedly imperfect) 
check on the possibility that our results are driven by classification error in the matching 
of mortality data to our sample. 
We use ICD-9 and ICD-10 codes in the NDI data to create measures of death 
from specific causes: homicide, suicide, accidents, and all other causes, which for 
convenience we call “disease” (the most common of which are deaths during the 
perinatal period, leukemia / neoplasms, cardiovascular disease, and respiratory 
problems). There are too few suicides to analyze separately, so we focus on all-cause 
mortality and our three specific causes.  1 3
  For cost reasons we carried out post-lottery passive address tracking for a random 
subsample of families. We link addresses to tract-level data from the 2000 census, annual 
beat-level data on violent and property crimes per 1,000 residents from the Chicago 
Police Department, and data from the 1995 community surveys of the Project on Human 
Development in Chicago Neighborhoods, which includes measures of social disorder and 
“collective efficacy,” defined by sociologists as social cohesion and local social control 
measured at the level of a  “neighborhood cluster” that contains 2.5 census tracts on 
average (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997).
 Unfortunately, no data on housing unit 
quality are available for our sample. 
3.3 Empirical Strategy 
  We define our “treatment group” as children whose families were assigned a wait-
list number from 1-18,110, and so were offered a voucher by May 2003; the control 
group is everyone assigned a higher lottery number. We first conduct an omnibus F-test 
for differences between the treatment and control group using methods described in detail 
elsewhere (Jacob and Ludwig, forthcoming).  
  We then measure how the offer of a housing voucher affects the average post-
lottery neighborhood environments in which families live by essentially comparing the 
neighborhoods of families offered vouchers with those of families randomly assigned to 
the control group, known as the “intent to treat” (ITT) effect. Specifically we use 
ordinary least squares to estimate equation (1) with a person-quarter panel dataset for 
1997:Q3 through 2005:Q4, where it y measures child i’s neighborhood in quarter t, 
PostOfferit =1 if child i’s family was offered a voucher prior to t, else 0, and X is a set of 
controls including whether the family is offered a voucher some time after quarter t,  1 4
gender, spline functions in baseline age (kinks at 1, 2, 5, 8 and 15) and calendar time 
(kinks every 6 calendar quarters). We cluster standard errors at the household level to 
account for serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). 
(1)   it it it PostOffer y         X ) ( 1  
Since not all families who are offered vouchers use them to lease up, we also 
estimate the effect on neighborhood environments of using a voucher or not (the “effect 
of treatment on the treated,” or TOT) by applying two-stage least squares to equations (2) 
and (3). Intuitively, the TOT effect is essentially the ITT effect divided by the difference 
in voucher utilization rates between treatment and control groups. We calculate the TOT 
effect usingPostOffer it as an instrumental variable (IV) for an indicator variable 
Leasedit=1 if the family leases up with a housing voucher obtained from any source – 
either the CHAC lottery or one of the smaller, specialized voucher allocations that 
occurred during our study period, such as for families whose public housing projects 
were demolished (Bloom, 1984, Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996). As a benchmark for 
judging the size of the TOT effect, π1, we present our estimate for the control complier 
mean (CCM): the average outcome of children in the control group whose families would 
have used a voucher if assigned to the treatment group, which can take on negative values 
because of sampling variability (Katz, Kling and Liebman, 2001)
. 
(2)   it t it it PostOffer Leased           X 1  
(3)   yit  1Leasedit  Xt it, 
  For our main ITT estimates of voucher offer effects on mortality itself, we 
estimate equation (1) within the framework of a discrete-time hazard model using Logit 
models with Maximum Likelihood estimation (Allison, 1984). We use an unbalanced  1 5
person-quarter panel dataset that runs through either 2005:Q4 or the last quarter in which 
the child is alive, whichever comes first. We report the coefficient β1 in odds ratio (OR) 
terms for the probability of death in each quarter. The control variables are as above. As a 
sensitivity analysis, we also present results that control for a broader set of covariates. We 
also present the excess risk difference implied by our odds ratios, presented in terms of 
deaths per 100,000 per year, and defined as the difference between the predicted risk for 
the treatment group and the baseline risk (control mean, or CM): 
(4) Excess risk difference = [(OR*CM) / (1 – CM + OR*CM)]  - CM 
We re-estimate (1) separately for different causes of death (homicide, accident, 
and disease) where deaths from other causes besides than the one being examined are 
treated as censoring events. Motivated by previous findings from the MTO experiment 
for a gender difference in how youth respond to residential mobility, we also estimate 
equation (1) separately by gender. 
One data complication we encounter is that in our sample there are no deaths to 
treatment-group females after the offer of a voucher, so a value of 1 for PostOffer is 
perfectly predictive of mortality outcomes. As such the Logit coefficient on treatment is 
negative infinity, and Logit standard errors are undefined. This makes typical 
construction of standard errors infeasible. Without consistent standard errors (or finite 
point estimates) we are unable to construct Wald test statistics for hypothesis testing or 
confidence intervals constructed in the usual way (based on inverting the Wald test 
statistic). Additionally, this data circumstance makes us doubtful of whether the Linear 
Probability Model (which does give a point estimate and estimated standard error) can 
accurately approximate the binary outcome response to treatment for girls.  1 6
We are still able to test null hypotheses about the parameter of interest using 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests. In the unrestricted model, the “treated-by-post” observations 
are perfectly predicted, and so contribute zero to the log likelihood. In the restricted 
model, we impose the null hypothesis on the treatment parameter, maximize the 
likelihood function over the remaining parameters, and use the resulting log likelihood 
for the test. In our tables, we report p-values from Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests of the null 
hypothesis of no impact (Lehmann and Romano, 2005). 
We can also use LR tests to construct 95% confidence intervals.  To do so we find 
the set of parameter values that would not be rejected by a LR test at a 5% significance 
level (Lehmann and Romano, 2005). Due to the process of trying out a range of values 
and testing each, the resulting confidence intervals are called “profile likelihood ratio 
confidence intervals.” 
We view this problem as essentially a “small sample” problem, even though we 
have large samples (N>200,000) of at-risk children-quarters.  Presumably the true impact 
of the voucher on mortality is not perfectly protective, but deaths are uncommon enough 
that a strongly protective treatment, plus a bit of luck, can result in zero observed deaths.  
We believe that this type of problem may be common in settings where researchers 
combine high-quality quasi-experiments with large but not immense data samples and 
low-probability outcomes (such as mortality or uncommon diseases or conditions).  We 
believe that profile likelihood ratio confidence intervals can be a useful approach in such 
settings. 
  We also replicate our mortality results by applying linear probability models to 
equation (1) to estimate ITT effects and to equations (2) and (3) to obtain TOT estimates.  1 7
We report results in terms of deaths per 100,000 children per year. We use linear 
probability models for this sensitivity analysis, despite their well--known limitations, 
because non-linear IV estimates can be sensitive to functional form assumptions (Angrist, 
2001, Angrist and Pischke, 2009). We view the LPM results as least reliable for the girls-
only analysis, for reasons discussed just above. 
4. Results 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the baseline characteristics for the 2,506 
treatment group youth and the 9,342 control youth. The p-value on the F-test of the null 
hypothesis that the full set of treatment and control group means are jointly identical is 
.46. Among treatment families, 66% leased up with a voucher at any point during our 
study period (50% with a voucher from the CHAC lottery). Among the control group, 
36% ever leased up with a voucher (none from the CHAC lottery). 
  The third row of Table 2 shows that being offered a housing voucher (the ITT 
effect) reduces the poverty rate in the average census tract in which families live over the 
8.5 year study period (1997:Q3-2005:Q4) by 7 percentage points (95% CI -12 to -3 
percentage points), compared to a control mean of 48 percent. The TOT effect is 26 
percentage points (95% CI -46 to -7), compared to a control complier mean of 64 percent. 
The difference between the CM and CCM implies families who would live in the most 
distressed neighborhoods are the ones most likely to lease up with a voucher if offered 
one. (Results by gender are in Appendix Table 1). 
  The top panel of Table 3 presents our main results for the effects of being offered 
a voucher (the intent-to-treat effect) on overall mortality rates for all children 18 and 
under at baseline, and for males and females separately, from estimating equation (1)  1 8
with Logit maximum likelihood. For the full sample, the odds ratio for the ITT effect on 
all-cause mortality is equal to 1.11 (95% CI 0.54 to 2.10), and for males equals 1.50 
(95% CI 0.72 to 2.89). 
Our main finding is that being offered a voucher is perfectly predictive of 
mortality for females, so that the estimated odds ratio is 0 and the 95% likelihood ratio 
confidence interval ranges from 0 to 0.79. The likelihood ratio test enables us to reject the 
null hypothesis of no effect with a p-value of .03. The second panel of Table 3 replicates 
our estimates controlling for all the baseline measures from Table 1, while the third panel 
uses our alternative definition of death using a lower NDI match-quality threshold. 
The qualitative results for boys and girls are different (for girls the coefficient is 
negative and significantly different from zero, for boys it is positive and insignificant).  
To test for the equality of treatment effect across boys and girls, we estimate two models. 
In the first all the coefficients are allowed to vary by sex, including that of treatment. In 
the second, we constrain the treatment effect to be equal for boys and girls. However we 
continue to allow the other coefficients to vary by sex.  These two models are then 
compared via a Likelihood Ratio test.  This test results in moderate evidence against the 
hypothesis of equal treatment effects (p = 0.09).  
  Tables 4 and 5 present results separately for different causes of death using Logit 
and linear probability models, respectively. The estimated voucher effect on deaths from 
disease are of the same sign for male and female youth, but for homicides and fatal 
accidents the estimated effects are of the opposite signs for males versus females. The 
linear probability model results suggest the effect of using a voucher (TOT) for females is 
on the order of -130.2 per 100,000 (95% CI -207.6 to -50.4), driven by declines in deaths  1 9
from disease (-73.6, 95% CI -132.92 to -14.28) and homicide (-41.36, 95% CI -83.32 to 
0.56). 
5. Discussion 
  Our study examines the effects of moving into less distressed housing and 
neighborhood conditions with the assistance of a housing voucher, taking advantage of a 
natural experiment in Chicago resulting from the random assignment of voucher 
applicants to the program wait-list. We show voucher receipt causes large declines in 
neighborhood disadvantage, including for example a decline in census tract poverty rates 
of 26 percentage points (40 percent of the control complier mean). While we do not have 
measures of housing quality for our sample, data from the American Housing Survey 
suggest that 10% of public housing units vs. 7% of those in the private market have 
moderate physical housing problems, with no difference in severe housing problems 
(HUD 2009). 
  We find that moving out of high-poverty public housing projects in Chicago leads 
to large declines in mortality rates for female children and youth. Determining the exact 
magnitude of this impact is somewhat difficult in our study by the fact that there are no 
deaths in our sample to females after their families are offered housing vouchers, but 
presumably the true underlying probability of death to these girls is not zero. The 95% CI 
for the odds ratio of the estimated effect of a voucher offer on all-cause mortality for girls 
in our sample is (0, 0.79), as shown in Table 3, while the average annual mortality rate 
during our study period is 38.2 per 100,000 for girls in the control group (Table 5). 
Together these results imply that the intent to treat effect on all-cause mortality from 
being offered a housing voucher is at least -8 deaths per 100,000 per year.  2 0
We also find that moving out of disadvantaged public housing does not have the 
same protective effects on mortality outcomes for male youth. This pronounced gender 
difference in mobility impacts on mortality echoes findings from the MTO mobility 
experiment for other youth outcomes (Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007, Kling, Ludwig 
and Katz, 2005). The fact that the point estimate for voucher effects on disease mortality 
is of the same sign for male and female youth, but of opposite signs for homicides and 
accidental deaths, suggests gender differences in mobility effects on risky behavior as a 
possible behavioral mechanism underlying these findings. Although our findings for 
homicides and accidents for boys are limited in their statistical power, the point estimates 
are consistent with the MTO studies, finding that boys were more likely to be injured or 
engage in other problem behaviors. 
  The main challenge this study faces is limited statistical power due to few deaths.  
This illustrates the difficult tradeoff for research in this field.  Using population-level 
observational data will give improved power, but at the cost of relying on less-credible 
research designs.  In contrast our study has the strength of a strong research design, but at 
the cost of observing few deaths. It is unlikely that any study with randomized housing 
treatment would be able to assemble a larger study sample, since our sample is the full 
census of public housing families that applied for housing vouchers in the 3rd largest city 
in the US.  Finally, we can use our LR confidence intervals to provide bounds on the 
magnitude of the impact, and these bound suggests a very large effect for girls - at least a 
20% reduction. 
In thinking about the populations to which our findings may generalize, it is 
important to recognize that our sample is extremely disadvantaged with respect to both  2 1
their living conditions and health outcomes. While the U.S. poverty rate is around 13 
percent (Census, 2010), the baseline census tracts for our sample were 60 percent poor. 
Their average baseline police beats had violent crime rates of 39 per 1,000, compared to a 
citywide average of 23 (CPD 2009), and nationwide average of 6 (FBI, 1997). 
In terms of the population excess risk, the Chicago Housing Authority’s 2000 
annual report suggests there were 9,269 black females 18 and under living in public 
housing. If the mortality rate in public housing overall was similar to our study’s control 
mean, then if every public housing family that applied for a voucher in 1997 had been 
offered one, the mortality rate for all youth black females in public housing would have 
declined by 5 per 100,000 (17 percent).   
  Our findings have implications for a wide range of housing policies that affect the 
geographic concentration of poverty in America, including zoning rules that affect the 
availability of low-cost housing (Roberts, 2009), siting decisions for new housing 
projects (Hunt, 2009),
 and decisions about whether to fund housing projects versus 
housing vouchers (Olsen, 2003, Friedman, 1962, Quillian, 2005). Forecasting the effects 
of community-development interventions from our results is complicated by the fact that 
the data available to us severely limit our ability to identify key mechanisms of action. 
Our findings also potentially have implications for health policy debates about 
whether to try to equalize health spending across areas. Previous studies have shown, for 
example, that a family’s own income helps explain some – but only some – of the 
variation across areas in health expenditures (Sutherland, Fisher, and Skinner, 2009).
 Our 
results suggest that the geographic concentration of poverty within an area may also 
matter for health beyond each family’s own individual poverty status.  2 2
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Table One: Baseline Statistics 
 
   Overall   Control  Group  Treatment  Group 
African-American  0.98  0.98  0.98  
   (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14)  
         
Age     8.39  8.35  8.51  
   (4.70)  (4.69)  (4.75)  
         
Female   0.50  0.50  0.51  
   (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  
         
Head of Household Received TANF Second 
Quarter 1997 
0.78  0.78  0.76  
(0.42)  (0.41)  (0.43)  
         
Head of Household Second Quarter 
Earnings 1997 
1085.63  1051.57  1212.58  
(1999.23)  (1980.02)  (2064.73)  
         
Census Tract Percent Minority  0.95  0.95  0.96  
   (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.13)  
         
Census Tract Percent Black  0.89  0.89  0.89  
   (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.24)  
         
Census Tract Poverty Rate  0.60  0.61  0.60  
   (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20)  
         
Census Tract Has Poverty Rate <20%  0.03  0.03  0.02  
   (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.15)  
         
Census Tract Collective Efficacy Score  3.56  3.55  3.58  
   (0.37)  (0.38)  (0.32)  
         
Census Tract Social Capital Score  3.41  3.41  3.42  
   (0.33)  (0.35)  (0.28)  
         
Neighborhood Poverty Crime Rate  120.19  120.33  119.69  
   (65.75)  (65.98)  (64.89)  
         
Neighborhood Violent Crime Rate  39.14  39.32  38.48  
   (25.94)  (25.89)  (26.10)  
          
Observations (number of children)  11,848   9,342  2,506  
 
Notes: The unit of analysis is individual child at baseline. Sample consists of all children 18 and younger whose 
families were living in public housing at the time they applied for a housing voucher in Chicago in July, 1997. 
Standard deviations in parentheses.  Crime rates are per 1,000 residents measured at the "beat" level.All income 
measured in 2007 dollars.  See text for discussion of all estimates. 
 




Table Two: Effects Of Voucher Offer (Intent to Treat) and Voucher Utilization (Treatment on the 
Treated) On Neighborhood Poverty And Residential Mobility 
    
 
Control Mean  Intent to Treat  Treatment on Treated  Control Complier Mean 
Number of 
Moves 
2.46 0.21  0.83  2.19 
  (-0.16, 0.59)  (-0.54, 0.19)   
        
Census Tract 
Percent Black 
0.84 0.01  0.02  0.87 




0.48 -0.07  -0.26  0.64 





0.10 0.09  0.31  -0.11 





3.65 0.04  0.12  3.56 




3.45 0.04  0.12  3.37 




84.47 -1.31  -4.26  74.52 




21.94 -0.61  -1.96  18.86 
  (-2.93, 1.72)  (-9.52, 5.60)   
 
Observations        
# Children    658     
# Children-
quarters   31,647     
 
Notes: The unit of analysis is the child-calendar quarter. For cost reasons, address tracking was carried out 
for just a random subset of 10% of our sample. Table comes from estimating equation (1) with ordinary 
least squares, controlling for gender, an indicator for whether the family is offered a voucher at some point 
after quarter t, and splines in baseline age and calendar time (see text). For ITT and TOT results, table 
presents point estimate and 95% CI in parentheses. For TOT estimates, “treatment” is defined as use of any 
voucher from any allocation during our study period (see text).  2 7
Table Three: Logit Results for Intent to Treat Effects of Housing Voucher Offer On All-Cause Mortality 
  Boys and 
Girls  Boys Girls 
Default specification (control for spline in baseline age and 
calendar time)   
Odds Ratio Estimate  1.11  1.50  0.00 
Likelihood Ratio 95% CI  (0.54, 2.10)  (0.72, 2.89)  (0, 0.79) 
Likelihood Ratio test of null hypothesis of no effect  
(p-value)  0.75 0.26 0.03 
Excess Risk Implied by Odds Ratio Estimate  7.63  50.09  -38.16 




N deaths (total / control / treatment pre / treatment post)
a (69/55/3/11)  (53/40/2/11)  (16/15/1/0) 
Expanded Covariates (add controls for baseline 
characteristics in Table 1)   
Odds Ratio  1.14  1.54  0.00 
Likelihood Ratio 95% CI  (0.55, 2.14)  (0.73, 2.97)  (0,0.82) 
Likelihood ratio test of null hypothesis of no effect (p-
value)  0.71 0.24 0.03 
Excess Risk Implied by Odds Ratio Estimate  9.71  54.09  -38.16 




N deaths (total / control / treatment pre / treatment post)
a (69/55/3/11)  (53/40/2/11)  (16/15/1/0) 
Default specification with lower threshold for match quality 
to National Death Index   
Log Odds Estimate  0.93  1.38  0.18 
Likelihood Ratio 95% CI  (0.49, 1.63)  (0.68, 2.53)  (0, 0.88) 
Likelihood Ratio test of null hypothesis of no effect (p-
value)  0.81 0.35 0.03 
Excess Risk Implied by Odds Ratio Estimate  -8.30  54.22  -77.17 




N deaths (total / control / treatment pre / treatment post)
a (119/94/12/13)  (76/57/7/12)  (43/37/5/1) 
Observations     
Children 11,848  5,928  5,920 
Children-quarters (main results)  401,822  200,811  201,011 
Children-quarters (alternative death measure)  400,695  200,263  200,432 
Notes: a = Total deaths reported over the entire study period (the 8.5 years between 1997:Q3 through 2005:Q4). 
Figures for treatment pre and treatment post are for the person-quarters before and after treatment group family 
was offered a voucher through the CHAC 1997 voucher lottery (see text). The unit of analysis is the child-calendar 
quarter. Table comes from estimating equation (1) with Logit maximum likelihood, controlling for gender, an 
indicator for whether the family is offered a voucher at some point after quarter t, and splines in baseline age and 
calendar time. Excess risk figures are reported as deaths per 100,000 children per year. 
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Table Four: Logit Estimates for Housing Voucher Intent to Treat Effects On Mortality: Different 
Causes of Death 
  Boys and 
Girls  Boys Girls 
Disease      
Odds Ratio  0.37  0.82  0.00 
Likelihood ratio 95% CI  (0.02, 1.88)  (0.04, 4.59)  (0, 1.46) 
Likelihood ratio test of null hypothesis 
of no effect (p-value)  0.27 0.84  0.09 
Excess Risk Implied by Odds Ratio 
Estimate  -14.31 -4.06  -22.88 
Excess Risk 95% CI  (-22.27, 
19.985)  (-21.66, 80.91)  (-22.88, 10.52) 
N deaths (total / control / treatment pre / 
treatment post)
a  (19/18/0/1) (10/9/0/1)  (9/9/0/0) 
Homicide      
Odds Ratio  1.32  1.58  0 
Likelihood ratio 95% CI  (0.52, 2.96)  (0.61, 3.63)  (0, 3.06) 
Likelihood ratio test of null hypothesis 
of no effect (p-value)  0.53 0.32  0.22 
Excess Risk Implied by Odds Ratio 
Estimate  10.50 30.53  -12.72 
Excess Risk 95% CI  (-15.76, 64.30)  (-20.54, 138.28)  (-12.72, 26.19) 
N deaths (total / control / treatment pre / 
treatment post)
a  (35/26/2/7) (31/21/2/7)  (5/5/0/0) 
Accident      
Odds Ratio  2.11  2.56  0 
Likelihood Ratio 95% CI  (0.44, 7.79)  (0.52, 9.87)  (0, 21.98) 
Likelihood ratio test of null hypothesis 
of no effect  0.31 0.22  0.48 
Excess Risk Implied by Odds Ratio 
Estimate  11.23 27.38  -2.54 
Excess Risk 95% CI  (-5.67, 68.66)  (-8.43, 155.49)  (-2.54, 53.26) 
N deaths (total / control / treatment pre / 
treatment post)
a  (12/8/1/3) (10/7/0/3)  (2/1/1/0) 
Observations      
Children 11,848  5,928  5,920 
Children-quarters 401,822  200,811  201,011 
Notes: a = Total deaths reported over the entire study period (the 8.5 years between 1997:Q3 through 
2005:Q4). Figures for treatment pre and treatment post are for the person-quarters before and after treatment 
group family was offered a voucher through the CHAC 1997 voucher lottery (see text).The unit of analysis 
is the child-calendar quarter. Table comes from estimating equation (1) with Logit maximum likelihood, 
controlling for gender, an indicator for whether the family is offered a voucher at some point after quarter t, 
and splines in baseline age and calendar time (see text). Excess risk reported as deaths per 100,000 children 
per year. 
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Table 5: ITT and TOT Effects of Housing Vouchers on Mortality from Linear Probability Models 
Boys and Girls  CM  ITT  TOT  CCM 
Death All Causes  69.44  8.32  27.04  63.60 
   (-47.48,  64.12)  (-154.72,  208.84)   
Death From Disease  22.72  -13.48  -43.92  56.86 
    (-32.52, 5.56)  (-106.2, 18.36)   
Death From Homicide  32.84  13.36  43.56  8.24 
   (-31.4,  58.12)  (-102.4,  189.56)   
Death From Accident  10.12  12.20  39.72  -13.83 
   (-15.2,  39.6)  (-49.52,  128.96)   
Observations        
Children   11,848    
Children-quarters   401,822    
Boys Only        
Death All Causes  100.32  60.44  203.88  -15.804 
   (-51.52,  172.4)  (-175.12,  582.92)   
Death From Disease  22.56  -3.69  -12.44  39.31 
   (-37.68,  30.28)  (-127.12,  102.24)   
Death From Homicide  52.68  42.00  141.64  -34.16 
    (-48.76, 132.72)  (-165.6, 448.88)   
Death From Accident  17.56  29.88  100.84  -47.12 
   (-25.6,  85.4)  (-86.72,  288.44)   
Observations        
Children   5,928    
Children-quarters   200,811    
Girls Only        
Death All Causes  38.16  -40.88  -130.20  129.00 
    (-65.28, -16.52)  (-207.6, -50.4)   
Death From Disease  22.88  -23.32  -73.60  73.61 
   (-41.92,  -4.76)  (-132.92,  -14.28)   
Death From Homicide  12.72  -13.12  -41.36  41.37 
    (-26.32, 0.09)  (-83.32, 0.56)   
Death From Accident  2.54  -4.44  -14.00  14.02 
   4.48  14.20   
    (-13.28, 4.36)  (-41.88, 13.84)   
Observations        
Children   5,920    
Children-quarters   201,011    
 
Notes: For counts of total number of deaths, please see Tables 3 and 4. The unit of analysis is the child-calendar 
quarter. Table comes from estimating equation (1) with Logit maximum likelihood, controlling for gender, an 
indicator for whether the family is offered a voucher at some point after quarter t, and splines in baseline age and 
calendar time. For ITT and TOT results, table presents point estimate and 95% CI in parentheses. 
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FOR WEB PUBLICATION ONLY 
Appendix Table 1: Effects Of Voucher Offer (Intent to Treat) and Voucher Utilization (Treatment on the Treated) On 
Neighborhood Poverty And Residential Mobility, by Gender 
 
  Boys Only    Girls Only 


















Number of Moves  2.46 0.45  2.04  1.15  2.45 0.01  0.04  2.85 
  (0.04, 0.85)  (-0.36, 4.44)      (-0.45, 0.47)  (-1.53, 1.60)   
               
Census Tract 
Percent Black 
0.85 -0.04  -0.14  0.93  0.83 0.05  0.16  .76 
  (-0.12, 0.05)  (-0.50, 0.21)      (-0.01, 0.12)  (-0.04, 0.35)   
               
Census Tract 
Poverty Rate 
0.47 -0.10  -0.40  0.72  0.49 -0.05  -0.15  .58 
  (-0.16, -0.05)  (-0.69, -0.10)      (-0.10, 0.01)  (-0.33, 0.04)   
               
Tract Has Poverty 
Rate <20% 
0.11 0.15  0.59 -0.29  0.10 0.03  0.09  .03 
  (0.05, 0.26)  (0.06, 1.13)      (-0.05, 0.11)  (-0.18, 0.35)   
               
Tract Collective 
Efficacy Score 
3.65 0.04  0.15  3.56  3.65 0.03  0.1  3.57 
  (-0.01, 0.10)  (-0.06, 0.35)      (-0.03, 0.10)  (-0.11, 0.32)   
               
Tract Social 
Capital Score  3.45 0.03  0.12  3.38  3.45 0.04  0.13  3.37 
  (0.00, 0.07)  (-0.01, 0.25)      (0.00, 0.08)  (-0.01, 0.26)   
               
Property Crime 
Rate 
83.79 0.18  0.63  71.69  85.1 -2.16  -6.61  42.23 
  (-11.31, 11.68)  (-39.03, 40.29)      (-11.69, 7.36)  (-35.73, 22.51)   
               
Violent Crime Rate  21.89 -0.82  -2.83  19.58  21.99 -0.25  -0.76  17.8 
  (-3.78, 2.14)  (-12.97, 7.31)      (-2.53, 2.04)  (-7.77, 6.25)   
Observations               
# Children    311        347     
# Children-
quarters   15,015       16,632     
               
Notes: The unit of analysis is the child-calendar quarter. For cost reasons, address tracking was carried out for just a random 
subset of 10% of our sample. Table comes from estimating equation (1) with ordinary least squares, controlling for gender, an 
indicator for whether the family is offered a voucher at some point after quarter t, and splines in baseline age and calendar time. 
For ITT and TOT results, table presents point estimate and 95% CI in parentheses.   
 